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Abstract
We provide an exact analytical solution of the Nash equilibrium for the kth price auction by using inverse of
distribution functions. As applications, we identify the unique symmetric equilibrium where the valuations have
polynomial distribution, fat tail distribution and exponential distributions.
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1 Introduction
In a kth price auction with k or more bidders, the highest bidder wins the bid and pays the kth highest bid as price.
The kth price auction has been studied by many researchers in recent years. Readers can refer to [2, 3, 4, 9] for
related literature. The Revenue Equivalence Theorem (RET) (see [6], [7]) can be used to characterize equilibrium
strategies of kth price auction. Monderer and Tennenholtz [5] proved the uniqueness of the equilibrium strategies
in kth price auctions for k = 3. Under some regularity assumptions, they also provided a characterization equation
of the equilibrium bid function (see theorem 2.1 below). Wolfstetter [10] solved the equilibrium kth price auctions
for a uniform distribution. Recently, Nawar and Sen [11] represented the solution of Monderer and Tennenholtz’s
characterization equation as a finite series involving Catalan numbers. With their representation, they provided
a closed form solution of the unique symmetric, increasing equilibrium of a kth price auction for a second degree
polynomial distribution.
In this paper, we analysis Monderer and Tennenholtz’s characterization equation by using a method involving
inverse of distribution functions. We provide a new representation of the equilibrium bid function of kth price
auction with this representation. For applications, we extend Nawar and Sen’s results and provide a closed form
solution of a kth price auction for polynomial distribution, fat tail distribution and exponential distributions.
After recalling the framework of the problem in Section 2, we prove our main result in Section 3. Then, in
Section 4, we compare our result with those of Nawar and Sen. Finally in Section 5 we provide a closed-form
solution of the equilibrium bid function for polynomial distribution, exponential distribution and a class of fat tail
distributions.
2 Notations and assumptions
In this section we present our assumptions and recall the result on the uniqueness of the equilibrium strategies
provided by Monderer and Tennenholtz. Consider a kth price auction with n bidders, where the highest bidder
wins, and pays only the kth highest bid. Let k > 2 and n > k. We make the following assumptions as in [7]:
1. The valuations Xi, i = 1, · · · , n of the bidders are independent and identically distributed with distribution
function F .
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2. The distribution function F is with values in I where I = [0, 1] or I = R+.
We also assume that:
(A) F is k − 2 times continuously differentiable and the density function f := F ′ satisfying ∀x ∈ I, f(x) > 0.
We remark that under the assumption of the density function f , the quantile function Q := F−1 exists and is
well-defined on (0, 1). Note that for an analysis of the 3rd price auction in the literature, the existence and the
continuity of the density function are often assumed. It is thus natural to assume (A) holds for the case of general
kth price auctions. We denote by βi the strategy of the bidder i which determines its bid for any value. A strategy
profile for n bidders is given by (β1, ..., βn). A strategy profile is symmetric if βi are all equal to a common strategy
β. A symmetric strategy is increasing if β is an increasing function. The equilibrium of a kth price auction with a
symmetric strategy profile is characterized by the following theorem:
Theorem 2.1. [Monderer and Tennenholtz[5]] Let β : [0, 1] 7→ R+. A symmetric strategy profile with common
strategy β is an equilibrium of the kth price auction if and only if the following two conditions hold.
(E1) β is an increasing function.
(E2) For all x ∈ [0, 1]: ∫ x
0
[x − β(y)]F (y)n−k[F (x) − F (y)]k−3f(y)dy = 0. (1)
Moreover (1) has at most one solution and for such a solution β is differentiable for all x ∈ Supp(f), here Supp(f)
denotes the support of the distribution with density f .
According to Theorem 2.1, for a given F , if we can compute β and show that β is differentiable and increasing,
then β is the unique equilibrium bid function. If the equilibrium bid function β exists, β(X) is the random variable
representing the equilibrium strategy of bidders with valuation X . Furthermore, if β is strictly increasing, together
with differentiability of β and the assumption that F has a density, we can deduce that β(X) also has a continuous
density function. We denote Fˆ the distribution function of β(X) (that is, Fˆ (β(x)) = F (x)) and Qˆ := Fˆ−1 the
quantile function.
3 Analysis of equilibrium
Here we present our main result. We give a closed form solution of equation (1) for k > 3. With this solution,
we are able to find a closed form expression of the bid function for some non linear distributions. The key idea is,
instead of working directly with the distribution function F as in the literature, we use the quantile function Q,
which can largely simplify the calculus and give a better insight.
Theorem 3.1. Assume that β : [0, 1] 7→ R+ is an increasing function and β(X) has an increasing distribution
function with a continuous density. Denote x˜ = F (x) and γ(x˜) := Q(x˜)x˜n−2. Then (1) has a unique solution given
by
β(x) =
γ(k−2)(x˜)
(k − 2)!
(
n−2
k−2
)
F (x)n−k
, (2)
where the superscript (t) is the tth order derivative with respect to x˜.
Proof. Denote
s(x) := x
∫ x
0
[F (x) − F (y)]k−3F (y)n−kf(y)dy, (3)
w(x) :=
∫ x
0
β(y)[F (x) − F (y)]k−3F (y)n−kf(y)dy. (4)
Note that (1) can be written as s(x) = w(x).
Since F ′(y) = f(y), making the transformation z = F (y)/F (x) in (3) we have
s(x) = xF (x)n−2
∫ 1
0
(1− z)k−3zn−kdz = xF (x)n−2B(n− k + 1, k − 2), (5)
where B(c, d) is the beta function with B(c, d) = (c− 1)!(d− 1)!/(c+ d− 1)! for positive integers c,d. It follows that
s(x) =
xF (x)n−2
(k − 2)
(
n−2
k−2
) . (6)
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Make the transformation z = F (y) in (4). As β is increasing, we have F (y) = Fˆ (β(y)), so that
β(y) = Fˆ−1(F (y)) = Qˆ(F (y)) = Qˆ(z).
Thus,
w(x) =
∫ F (x)
0
Qˆ(z)[F (x)− z]k−3zn−kdz. (7)
As x˜ = F (x), we have x = Q(x˜). Denote
S(x˜) := s(Q(x˜)) and W (x˜) := w(Q(x˜)).
Also recall that γ(x˜) := Q(x˜)x˜n−2. Then from (6):
S(x˜) = s(Q(x˜)) = s(x) =
γ(x˜)
(k − 2)
(
n−2
k−2
) . (8)
By (7):
W (x˜) := w(Q(x˜)) = w(x) =
∫ x˜
0
Qˆ(z)(x˜− z)k−3zn−kdz. (9)
According to (1), S(x˜) = W (x˜). Noticing that assumption (A) ensures that S(x˜) is k − 2 times continuously
differentiable, we have:
S(k−2)(x˜) =W (k−2)(x˜). (10)
S(k−2)(x˜) is known by (8). To find W (k−2)(x˜), apply Lemma 7.1 of the Appendix. Taking m = n− k and r = k− 3
in Lemma 7.1, it follows that
W (k−2)(x˜) = (k − 3)!Qˆ(x˜)x˜n−k.
Together with (8) and (10), we have:
γ(k−2)(x˜)
(k − 2)
(
n−2
k−2
) = (k − 3)!Qˆ(x˜)x˜n−k. (11)
As Fˆ (β(x)) = F (x) = x˜, we have Qˆ(x˜) = Fˆ−1(x˜) = β(x). Using this, (2) follows from (11).
Remark 3.1. By the Leibniz rule for derivation,
γ(k−2)(x˜) =
k−2∑
i=0
(
k − 2
i
)
(x˜n−2)(k−2−i)Q(i)(x˜)
=
k−2∑
i=0
(
k − 2
i
)
(n− 2)!
(n− k + i)!
x˜n−k+iQ(i)(x˜)
Recall that x˜ = F (x), from equation (2), we have:
β(x) =
k−2∑
i=0
(
k − 2
i
)
(n− k)!
(n− k + i)!
x˜iQ(i)(x˜)
= Q(x˜) +
k − 2
n− k + 1
Q′(x˜) +
k−2∑
i=2
(
k − 2
i
)
(n− k)!
(n− k + i)!
x˜iQ(i)(x˜) (12)
Since Q(x˜) = F−1(x˜) = x and Q′(x˜) = 1/F ′(x) = 1/f(x), for k > 4 we have
β(x) = x+
k − 2
n− k + 1
F (x)
f(x)
+
k−2∑
i=2
(
k−2
i
)
F (x)iQ(i)(x˜)
(n− k + 1)...(n− k + i)
= x+
k − 2
n− k + 1
F (x)
f(x)
+O
(
1
n2
)
.
This result coincides with the result of Wolfsteller [10] in O( 1n2 ). Moreover it agrees with the expression in proposition
3 of Gadi Fibich and Arieh Gavious’s work in [1].
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4 Comparison with Nawar and Sen’s result
Applying the revenue equivalence principle for expected payment of a bidder in a kth price auction with n bidders,
Nawar and Sen (2018)[11] have obtained the following expression of β(x):
β(x) =
ψk−1(x)
(k − 2)!
(
n−2
k−2
)
F (x)n−k
, (13)
where
ψ0(x) =
∫ x
0
yF (y)n−2f(y)dy and ψt+1(x) =
ψ′t(x)
f(x)
for t = 0, 1, ... (14)
By making the transformation z = F (y) we have ψ0(x) =
∫ x˜
0
Q(z)zn−2dz.
Thus
dψ0(x)
dx˜
= Q(x˜)x˜n−2 = γ(x˜).
Also note that as x˜ = F (x), we have dx˜dx = F
′(x) = f(x). By (14), we have
ψ1(x) =
dψ0(x)
dx
1
f(x)
=
dψ0(x)
dx˜
dx˜
dx
1
f(x)
= γ(x˜).
Applying the iterative definition of (14) again, we have:
ψ2(x) =
dψ1(x)
dx
1
f(x)
=
dψ1(x)
dx˜
dx˜
dx
1
f(x)
=
dγ(x˜)
dx˜
= γ(1)(x˜).
By induction, if ψt(x) = γ
(t−1)(x˜), then
ψt+1(x) =
dψt(x)
dx
1
f(x)
=
dψt(x)
dx˜
dx˜
dx
1
f(x)
=
dγ(t)(x˜)
dx˜
.
This shows that ψt(x) = γ
(t−1)(x˜) for t = 1, 2, .... So ψk−1(x) = γ
(k−2)(x˜) and the expression (13) coincides
with our expression (2). Therefore, our expression (2) is an equivalence representation of Nawar and Sen’s result.
Instead of expanding ψ with series about Catalan numbers, we compute it with the quantile function. From this
expression (2), it is easy to establish the equilibrium for some non linear distributions, and we will detail them in
the next section.
5 Examples of Equilibrium for some distributions
5.1 Equilibrium for non linear distribution
In this section we study the equilibrium bid function for some non-linear distributions. First of all, as a corollary
of theorem 3.1, we provide sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium bid function.
Then, we will provide a closed-form solution of the equilibrium bid function for polynomial distribution, exponential
distribution, a class of fat tail distributions.
According to theorem 2.1, for some distribution F , if one can show that β found by (2) is an strictly increasing
function, it will follow that the symmetric strategy profile with common strategy β is an equilibrium of the kth
price auction.
Corollary 5.1. Consider a kth price auction where each Xi is i.i.d. on the interval [0, 1] with quantile function Q.
Assume that it holds
∀i ∈ [|1, k − 1|], ∀x˜ ∈ [0, 1), Q(i)(x˜) > 0. (15)
Then the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium bid function is given by (2) and can be rewritten as
β(x) = x+
k−2∑
i=1
(
k − 2
i
)
(n− k)!
(n− k + i)!
x˜iQ(i)(x˜), (16)
with x˜ = F (x).
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Proof. Equation (16) is direct from equation (12). By equation (15), we deduce that for i = 0, · · · , k − 2, Q(i)(x˜)
is strictly increasing with respect to x˜. Together with the fact that x˜ = F (x) is increasing strictly with respected
to x, according to equation (12), we deduce that β(x) is strictly increasing. The conclusion follows.
For some distributions, the condition Q(i)(x˜) > 0 for all x˜ ∈ [0, 1) is easy to check but for some it is not. For
many non-linear distributions, the quantile function Q is analytic on [0, 1). According to the latter corollary, we
provide another sufficient condition as follows, the condition (P+), which is easy to check.
Condition (P+) : The function Q is analytic on [0, 1) with positive coefficient in the representation of power
series. More precisely, there exist positive αi, such that for x ∈ [0, 1),
Q(x˜) =
∞∑
i=0
αix˜
i.
The equality is defined in the sense of power series, reader can refer to any power series literature for a complete
justification of technical convergence details. From condition (P+), deriving the equation successively, it is easy to
see that equation (15) holds. According to corollary 5.1, β is an equilibrium bid function. To check the condition
(P+), we only need to calculate the Taylor expansion of the quantile function Q on 0, then check the sign of the
Taylor coefficient. Here are some examples of applications of corollary 5.1.
Example 5.1 (Exponential distribution.). Let F (x) := 1 − e−λx for λ > 0 and x ∈ R+. The equilibrium bid
function is given by (2). In fact Q(x) := −1λ ln(1 − x). Moreover Q
(i)(x) = i!λ(1−x)i for i ∈ [|1, k − 1|], which is
strictly positive on [0, 1). According to Corollary 5.1, the equilibrium bid function β(x) has the expression:
β(x) = x+
1
λ
k−2∑
i=1
(
k − 2
i
)
(n− k)!
(n− k + i)!
x˜i
i!
(1− x˜)i
,
where x˜ = F (x).
Example 5.2 (Fat tail distribution.). Let F (x) := 1 − 1xc for some c > 0 and for x ∈ R
+. The equilibrium bid
function is given by (2). In fact Q(x) := 1(1−x)c . Moreover Q
(i)(x) = c(c+1)...(c+i−1)x˜
i
(1−x˜)c+i for i ∈ [|1, k − 1|], which is
strictly positive on [0, 1). According to Corollary 5.1, the equilibrium bid function β(x) has the expression:
β(x) = x+
k−2∑
i=1
(
k − 2
i
)
(n− k)!
(n− k + i)!
c(c+ 1)...(c+ i− 1)x˜i
(1− x˜)c+i
,
where x˜ = F (x).
Theorem 5.2. Consider a kth price auction where each Xi is iid on the interval [0, 1], with distribution function
F (x) = xα where α > 0. Then there is a unique symmetric equilibrium. The equilibrium common strategy β :
[0, 1] 7→ R+ is
β(x) =
Γ(n− k + 1)Γ(n− 1 + 1/α)
Γ(n− 1)Γ(n− k + 1 + 1/α)
x, (17)
where Γ is the Gamma function. In particular, if α = 1m where m is a positive integer,
β(x) =
(n− k +m+ 1)...(n− 2 +m)
(n− k −+1)...(n− 2)
x.
Proof. To prove this, we find β using theorem 3.1 and show that it is a strictly increasing function of x. As
x˜ = F (x) = xα, it follows Q(x˜) = F−1(x˜) = x˜1/α = x. Then
γ(x˜) = Q(x˜)x˜n−2 = x˜n−2+1/α.
Therefore,
γ(k−2)(x˜) = (n− 2 + 1/α)(n− 3 + 1/α)...(n− k + 1 + 1/α)x˜n−k+1/α
=
Γ(n− 1 + 1/α)
Γ(n− k + 1 + 1/α)
F (x)n−kx.
Together with (2), (17) follows.
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7 Appendix
Lemma 7.1. Consider a real valued bounded function Qˆ : R 7→ [0, 1]. For positive integer r and positive real
number m, let Ar(u, z) := Qˆ(z)(u− z)
rzm and Hr(u) :=
∫ u
0
Ar(u, z)dz. Then the (r + 1)
th derivative of Hr(u) is
H(r+1)r (u) = r!Qˆ(u)u
m. (18)
Proof. By the Leibniz rule [12] of differentiating an integral, if H(u) :=
∫ l1(u)
l0(u)
A(u, z)dz, under assumption of
integrability of ∂uA(u, z), it holds:
H ′(u) = [A(u, l1(u))l
′
1(u)−A(u, l0(u))l
′
0(u)] +
∫ l1(u)
l0(u)
∂uA(u, z)dz.
It is easy to check the integrability of ∂uQˆ(z)(u− z)
rzm, thus taking l0(u) = 0, l1(u) = u in the previous equation:
H ′r(u) = Ar(u, u) +
∫ u
0
∂uAr(u, z)dz. (19)
For r = 0, A0(u, u) = Qˆ(u)u
m and ∂uA0(u, z) = 0. For r > 1, Ar(u, u) = 0 and ∂uAr(u, z) = Qˆ(z)r(u− z)
r−1zm =
rAr−1(u, z). Therefore (19) implies
H ′r(u) = rHr−1(u) for r > 1 and H
′
0(u) = Qˆ(u)u
m.
Thus for t 6 r:
H(t)r (u) = r(r − 1)...(r − t+ 1)Hr−t(u),
so H
(r)
r (u) = r!H0(u) and therefore H
(r+1)
r (u) = r!H ′0(u) = r!Qˆ(u)u
m.
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